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5Introduction
The drug policy reform debate has implications for a 
wide range of issues – from crime and health, to the 
economy and even the environment. But for many, 
the overriding concern is the effect that any policy 
change would have on levels of drug consumption (and, 
implicitly, the negative consequences that stem from it). 
Indeed, the fear that drug use will increase following 
any move away from a punitive approach is the most 
frequently raised and politically potent of all the 
objections to reform, appealing to worries about things 
such as the health and welfare of loved ones, increased 
public disorder and drugged driving.  
Support for maintaining such an approach is typically 
predicated on three assumptions: 
• That criminalising (or otherwise punishing) drug 
users is necessary in order to deter people from 
using drugs; 
• that enforcement against the supply of drugs 
restricts their availability (and, in turn, their use) to 
a sufficiently worthwhile extent; and 
• that levels of use are a good proxy measure for 
levels of harm, both to drug users themselves and 
wider society.
This report argues that this rationale for continuing 
with an enforcement-led approach to drugs is poorly 
supported by empirical research, and that alternative 
policies – in particular the decriminalisation of personal 
drug possession or the introduction of legally regulated 
drug markets – can produce better outcomes while also 
avoiding dramatic increases in use. It also makes the 
case that overall levels of drug use are not an accurate 
indicator of levels of drug-related harm, and should not 
be considered as such.
Given the pace at which real-world alternatives to 
criminalisation and prohibition have taken hold in 
recent years, and the extent to which drug policy 
reform has become a mainstream issue, there is now 
no shortage of claims and counterclaims about how 
different policies affect levels of drug consumption. 
This report attempts to cut through this debate, 
addressing the widely held concern about increased use 
by reviewing the evidence acquired since the modern 
international drug control framework was established 
in the 1960s, and looking at what is known about 
other approaches to managing a range of substances. 
Ultimately, the intention is to provide a representative 
overview of what is known about the relationship 
between drug policy, drug use, and related harms. 
But there is also a need to be frank about what is 
currently uncertain: the more far-reaching the 
departure from the status quo, the more scope there is 
for unpredictability. So while there is now a significant 
body of research into drug use under prohibition, there 
is still no perfect counterfactual to it. Although there 
is direct evidence of how decriminalising drugs affects 
levels of consumption, there is a much more limited 
empirical basis for inferring what  the consequences 
would be of full-scale legalisation (which in any case 
can take many forms). That aside, taken together, the 
evidence presented in this report suggests the following 
broad conclusions:
• The importance of prevalence of use as an indicator 
of the success of drug policy is often overstated, 
at the expense of equally or more important 
indicators, such as problematic use or drug-related 
deaths;
• levels of drug use can be a poor proxy measure 
for levels of drug-related harm, and since such 
harm is the more important policy priority, more 
accurate, alternative indicators should be employed 
to measure it;
• the decriminalisation of drug possession for 
personal use has, at most, only a marginal impact 
on levels of drug use;
• legal drug markets that are highly commercialised 
and loosely regulated are likely to lead to significant 
increases in drug use compared with levels of use 
under prohibition with illicit markets;
• it is possible to create legal drug markets that 
are sufficiently regulated and taxed so as to 
avoid dramatic increases in drug use (including 
problematic use) compared with levels of use under 
6prohibition with illicit markets; and
• the effect of legalisation and regulation (however it 
is designed and implemented) on levels of drug use 
is likely to vary significantly depending on which 
drug or drugs are made legally available. 
2. Drug use: the issues
2. a) Drug use and harm
 
The academic debate on drug policy reform is most 
commonly framed in utilitarian terms (although 
politicians and the public often view it through a 
moral lens). So when participants in this debate make 
their case for a particular approach, they tend not to 
appeal to the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of drug-
taking, but to the magnitude of positive and negative 
consequences of drug-taking. Of course, different people 
with different values weight these various outcomes 
differently. So questions such as “Would legalisation be 
better than prohibition?” cannot, in the strictest sense, 
be answered scientifically. Nevertheless, the academic 
framing of the debate can and should be informed by 
empirical evidence.  
Taking an archetypal consequentialist approach, 
MacCoun and Reuter (2001; 2011) recommend that 
different drug policy regimes be evaluated by their 
effect on the overall level of harm caused by drug use. 
They identify three factors that determine most of the 
harms caused by drug use: the number of users, the 
average number of doses per user, and the average 
harm produced per incident of drug use. Expressed 
more clearly, the relationship is:
Total Harm = Prevalence x Intensity x Harmfulness
Those who support legalising drugs (or other reforms 
that reduce or eliminate penalties for possession) 
typically ascribe most importance to the last element 
of this equation, and include not just harms to the drug 
user, but costs to wider society as well in their definition 
of harmfulness.
So supporters of reform highlight how prohibition 
and criminalisation can dramatically increase the 
risks associated with drug use itself, as the primary 
risks of many illicit drugs are a product not of their 
pharmacology, but of their being produced and 
supplied by an unregulated criminal market, with users 
directed to the criminal justice system, rather than the 
healthcare system. Street heroin mixed with potent 
adulterants such as fentanyl and used with shared 
needles in unhygienic environments, for example, 
carries far greater risks than pure, pharmaceutical 
heroin (diamorphine) used in a supervised clinical 
setting.  
Added to this, the broader social costs stemming from 
drug use that are created or exacerbated by prohibition 
can include, among other things, the stigma and limited 
life chances that stem from a criminal conviction for 
drug possession, racial disparities in the enforcement 
of punitive drug laws, and the violence and conflict 
generated by street dealers and drug trafficking 
organisations. Such harms, it is argued, could be 
significantly reduced if the drug trade was moved above 
ground and legally regulated, or if users did not run the 
risk of being punished. 
The logical extension of such a focus on harmfulness is 
that if an incident of drug use does not cause significant 
harm to the user or others (or lead to harmful use later), 
then it should not be a concern of public policy. So, it is 
argued, policy should seek to reduce overall harms  – 
whether to the user or wider society – from problematic 
use, not necessarily to eliminate use per se. (This is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.c.)
By contrast, supporters of prohibition focus mostly on 
the first, and to a lesser extent the second, component 
of the equation above, rejecting changes to the status 
quo out of concern that drug use would increase if 
sanctions were reduced and/or a legal supply of drugs 
was established. After all, decriminalisation or legal 
regulation might cause total harm to rise if, despite 
reducing the average harm per incident of use, this 
was outweighed by a sufficiently large increase in 
the number of such incidents. And depending on the 
7extent of such an increase in use, that could ultimately 
mean higher levels of drug dependence, greater 
numbers of intoxication-related accidents, and/or 
drug-related deaths.
Both sides of the drug policy debate are therefore 
sometimes guilty of neglecting key factors that 
contribute to the overall amount of drug-related harm. 
Reformers are often reluctant to engage with the 
issue of whether, under a less punitive approach, use 
could rise to what would be, on net, more damaging 
levels; and advocates of prohibition rarely consider the 
proposition that an increase in use could be justified by 
a sufficiently large reduction in average harm. 
As alluded to above, use reduction has tended to be the 
dominant aim of drug policy, with the priority usually 
a reduction in the number of people who use drugs 
(rather than a reduction in the intensity of their use). 
In the US, for example, the national strategy of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (2007: 1) has 
historically been framed almost exclusively in terms of 
reducing the prevalence of use (although this has begun 
to change in recent years). 
2. b) The dominance of prevalence
The prevalence of drug use (the number of people 
using drugs in a given population) is clearly a legitimate 
concern under any policy model, but its status as the 
key indicator of the success or failure of drug policy 
stems in part from a simple lack of more accurate drug 
data systems. The production and use of illegal drugs is 
not something that market participants happily report 
to the authorities. Hence there is nothing like the kind 
of administrative data that exists for tracking activity in 
other, legal markets.
Drug arrests and drug-related deaths were originally 
used to monitor trends in drug supply and use, but 
these measures are highly imprecise: variations in the 
number of drug arrests, rather than signifying changes 
in consumption or production, can simply indicate 
changes in enforcement practices; and drug-related 
deaths are often multiply determined – an intoxicated 
driver killing a pedestrian may be recorded as a traffic 
death, rather than as a consequence of drug use.
So when drug use grew to the point of being a 
central concern in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a 
concerted effort to devise better data systems. This 
led to the development of school-based surveys of 
drug use by youth, and surveys of drug use in the 
general population (often called “household population 
surveys”). 
Data limitations therefore played a major role in the 
prevalence of drug use assuming such importance 
in the evaluation of drug policy. But this situation is 
also partly a function of a culture that has, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, defined the consumption of 
certain drugs as intrinsically wrong and damaging.
Public perceptions of illicit drug use (and those who 
engage in it) have been distorted by more than a 
century of moral panics, early examples of which were 
driven by racial prejudice and, in the United States in 
particular, by an influential Temperance movement 
that considered the use of all psychoactive drugs – 
including alcohol – as a root cause of social decay 
(Berridge and Edwards, 1981; Jay, 2002; Musto, 1999; 
Courtwright, 2005).
But while attitudes towards alcohol use changed 
following America’s failed experiment with alcohol 
prohibition, the use of other, more “foreign” drugs 
has remained highly stigmatised. Prohibition-era 
rhetoric was (and often still is) simply applied to a 
different range of substances, as can be seen in the UN 
convention that underpins today’s international drug 
control regime. It describes drug addiction as a “serious 
evil … fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind”, one that the international community has 
a “duty to … combat” (United Nations, 1961: 1). This set 
the tone for the “war on drugs” declared by President 
Richard Nixon in the 1970s.
Against this backdrop, in which the use of certain 
drugs is conceived of as a threat to the very fabric of 
society, it is perhaps unsurprising that drug policy has 
8overwhelmingly focused on prevalence reduction. 
“Harm reduction” approaches – which seek to make 
drug use safer, rather than just reduce or eliminate 
it – have faced significant political obstacles, arguably 
because they focus less on the simple fact of whether 
a person uses drugs, and more on whether a person’s 
drug use is having negative consequences (Harm 
Reduction International, 2016).
2. c) Prevalence of use as a measure of 
total harm
Clearly, drug use can, in itself, cause substantial harm to 
individuals, but it is by no means an inevitability. There 
are different types of drugs and drug-using behaviours, 
motivated by different priorities, which have different 
outcomes. It is far from the case that everyone who 
takes drugs becomes a chronic, dependent user, whose 
consumption is high-risk and likely to cause themselves 
and/or others harm. 
The prevalence of drug use can be estimated by a 
number of methods, including wastewater-testing, 
or testing of arrestees, but is usually calculated 
from survey data. This is then augmented by 
population-specific research, such as school-based 
surveys (although these are less consistent across 
jurisdictions, complicating national comparisons). 
Many countries have established surveys that focus 
specifically on drug-taking behaviour, while others 
incorporate questions about drug use into general 
health surveys, or, as in the case of England and 
Wales, into national crime surveys. The context of 
the survey inevitably influences the type of questions 
that are asked and who responds to it (EMCDDA, 
2009: 15) .
The European Model Questionnaire recommends that 
countries ask questions on a minimum of six drugs: 
cannabis, ecstasy, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines 
and LSD. However, some drug use is rarely captured; 
certain surveys now include questions on some 
new psychoactive substances (NPS), but not all (the 
bewildering array of such products making it all but 
impossible), while the use of diverted prescription 
drugs is generally poorly monitored, leaving a messy 
and incomplete picture of drug use trends.
Moreover, the very nature of these surveys leads to 
underestimates of the true extent of drug use: people 
are generally reluctant to admit to illegal activity, 
and added to this, the most high-risk, problematic 
drug users are unlikely to be represented in surveys 
of households, given that they often live chaotic 
lives (Home Office, 2006). The most commonly used 
types of surveys therefore bias prevalence estimates 
towards conservatism, even if they do so consistently, 
in a way that can reliably reveal trends.
Three indicators are typically used to measure 
the prevalence of drug use in a given country or 
jurisdiction: lifetime prevalence, last-year prevalence 
and last-month prevalence. Of these three indicators, 
lifetime prevalence – the number of people who 
have ever used drugs – is the least useful, because 
by definition, such use cannot be reversed: even if 
people stop using drugs, they will remain lifetime 
users. Lifetime prevalence therefore tends to rise 
consistently over time. (This measure is, however, 
considered more useful for schoolchildren, as 
initiation into most drug use occurs in teenage years, 
so lifetime prevalence can provide a better snapshot 
of drug-use trends among this group.) Last-year and 
last-month prevalence are better proxy measures of 
current levels of drug use, and should be used to track 
emerging consumption trends (EMCDDA, 2002).
Measuring the prevalence of drug use
9In fact, the vast majority of people who use drugs would 
not fit this description. The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015) – the agency 
that oversees the international prohibitionist drug 
control system – estimates that approximately 90% 
of people who use illicit drugs worldwide do so non-
problematically.1 Hence prevalence of use alone is not 
a particularly useful or accurate indicator of harm: it 
conflates both problematic and non-problematic drug 
consumption, even though the risks associated with 
each, and the responses that they call for, differ greatly. 
A 17-year-old heavy user of crystal methamphetamine 
who is supplied by a criminal market and commits 
crimes to feed their habit, risks causing far greater 
harm to themselves and others than does a middle-
aged, occasional cannabis user who grows their own 
plants. If the latter ceased their drug-taking while 
the former did not, the prevalence of drug use in this 
sample would fall by half, and yet would produce little, 
if any, change in total levels of health and social harm. 
While this distinction between the relative harms 
associated with different types of drug use is 
acknowledged in the academic debate on reform, it is 
frequently overlooked in the public debate – politicians’ 
press releases and media soundbites talk all too often 
about the prevalence of drug use as it were a single, 
homogenous phenomenon. 
That overall prevalence of use is a poor proxy measure 
for aggregate harm can be seen from the situation in 
the UK. In 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron said: 
“We have a policy which actually is working in Britain: 
drug use is coming down” (quoted in Wallis Simons, 
2014). The second part of this claim was essentially 
accurate at that time: the long-term picture was of a 
decline in the overall prevalence of drug use in the 
UK (although, since around 2010, use had actually 
1. The UNODC defines “problem drug users” as “people who engage 
in the high-risk consumption of drugs, for example people 
who inject drugs, people who use drugs on a daily basis and/or 
people diagnosed with drug use disorders or as drug-dependent 
…” http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_
Report_2014_web.pdf xvii
stabilised [Home Office, 2015]). Yet the picture is more 
complicated – and less impressive – when the broader 
context is examined.
The decline in overall levels of drug use that occurred 
in the previous decade was driven mostly by a 
reduction in the number of young people (aged 16-24) 
using cannabis, the most widely used illicit drug (see 
box, p. 10, for speculation on the causes of this trend). 
The use of other drugs has, however, proven more 
resilient. Between 2012/13 and 2014/15, the number of 
young people who took ecstasy in the past year almost 
doubled, to levels not seen since 2003, and young 
people’s cocaine use also sharply increased over the 
same period (Home Office, 2015). 
But despite this, overall prevalence was either in 
decline or stable. So does this consumption trend 
indicate that UK drug policy is “working”? A more 
useful indicator suggests not. Fewer people using drugs 
does not mean fewer people being harmed by drugs. 
The drug-induced mortality rate among adults in the 
UK was 55.9 deaths per million in 2013, almost three 
times the most recent European average of 19.2 deaths 
per million (EMCDDA, 2016). Official 2014 estimates 
for the whole of the UK are not yet available, but in 
England and Wales, drug-induced deaths reached the 
highest levels ever recorded (ONS, 2016). This trend is 
being driven by a complex mixture of factors, mostly 
related to opioid consumption. Nationally and locally, 
an ageing population of users, changes in available 
treatment options, and batches of particularly strong or 
contaminated opioids are behind the rise. These deaths, 
and the reasons for them, underline the importance 
of not taking headline figures on use as a simple 
determinant of policy success or failure.
It is also notable that, historically, governments tend 
to cite any change in levels of drug use as evidence to 
support their position: when use falls, it is heralded 
as a triumph that renders any debate about reform 
irrelevant; but when use rises, calls are made for 
enforcement efforts to be intensified. As such, a fixation 
on levels of use can often shut down vital discussions 
about policies that could deliver better outcomes.
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From 2000-14, levels of cannabis use among 15- to 
34-year-olds remained stable or increased in many 
European countries, including France, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland (EMCDDA, 2015b). In England 
and Wales, however, consumption among this group 
fell by almost half over the same period (EMCDDA, 
2015a). Listed below are several possible explanations 
that have been put forward for this trend. (It should 
be noted that these are all speculative explanations, 
reflected by the references given for them, most of 
which are to news articles that feature interviews 
with drug policy experts, rather than peer-reviewed 
research. These proposed explanations should 
therefore be treated with caution, although they 
usefully illustrate how drug use is influenced by 
myriad factors, rather than policy alone.)
• The decline in tobacco smoking in the UK. The 
fall in the number of tobacco smokers, which 
predates the fall in cannabis use, may have 
helped de-normalise smoking more generally. 
And since Britons commonly consume cannabis 
in a mix with tobacco, fewer non-smokers may 
be taking up the drug (The Economist, 2015).
• The rise of high-strength “skunk”. The UK 
cannabis market is increasingly dominated 
by more potent varieties of the drug that are 
unappealing to novice users given the higher 
probability of negative experiences (McVeigh and 
O’Neill, 2012).
• A cultural shift. The decline in young people’s 
cannabis use is mirrored by similar, but less 
pronounced, declines in alcohol consumption and 
the use of other drugs, pointing to the possible 
emergence of a more abstemious and risk-averse 
youth culture (McVeigh and O’Neill, 2012; 
Benedictus, 2011).
• The rise of the internet and social media. Smart 
phones, the internet and gaming consoles may 
be having an effect on young people’s behaviour 
in relation to drugs (Goldhill, 2014; Barnes, 2012). 
The rise of such technology may be reducing 
boredom or the amount of “dead time” that might 
otherwise be filled by casual drug use, or it may 
be reducing real-world interactions in which 
drug sharing or peer pressure come into play 
(Cabinet Office and Department of Health, 2015). 
Online photo sharing may also be increasing 
image and body consciousness, turning people 
off more unhealthy or unattractive drug-using 
behaviours. 
• The rise of new psychoactive substances. Some 
young people may be switching from real 
cannabis to synthetic cannabinoids, such as 
“Spice”, which mimic its effects and were, until 
a blanket ban in 2016, relatively cheaply and 
legally available via high-street “head shops”. 
Comparatively little is known about levels of use 
of such substances (EMCDDA, 2015b).
• Societal changes. More young people are living 
at their parents’ home than in previous years 
(ONS, 2011), which may be limiting opportunities 
for illicit behaviour such as cannabis use. The 
employment rate for 16-17-year-olds has also 
declined substantially over the past decade (ONS, 
2013), potentially meaning fewer teenagers have 
the money to purchase cannabis.
Declining cannabis use in England and Wales: possible causes
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2. d) Beneficial drug use?
The use of illicit drugs, even when moderate, controlled, 
and recognised as being relatively low-risk, is still 
typically characterised as antisocial or having net 
adverse effects. There is a general reluctance to accept 
or admit that currently illicit substances may confer 
any benefits to users or wider society.
In contrast, this point is often acknowledged with 
regard to the use of licit drugs. The UK government’s 
2012 Alcohol Strategy, for example, says: 
“In moderation, alcohol consumption can have a 
positive impact on adults’ wellbeing, especially where 
this encourages sociability. Well-run community 
pubs and other businesses form a key part of the 
fabric of neighbourhoods, providing employment 
and social venues in our local communities. And 
a profitable alcohol industry enhances the UK 
economy” (HM Government, 2012: 3).
It is difficult to imagine any government making a 
similar statement in reference to illicit drugs, but the 
logic is sound: most currently illegal substances can 
be – and most often are – consumed responsibly, with 
negligible harm resulting either to users or wider 
society. (And where harm to wider society does occur, 
it is often a product of the criminal nature of the drug 
trade, rather than drug use itself.) 
All of this is not to say that policy should not attempt 
to deter people (particularly young people or other 
vulnerable populations) from using drugs – especially in 
high-risk ways; it is simply to highlight the distinction 
between drug use and drug harm, and place this 
distinction within the context of the reasons why 
people take drugs in the first place. 
Pleasure is the “great unmentionable” (Hunt and Evans, 
2008) in drug policy research and the public debate 
on reform (Moore, 2008; Holt and Treloar, 2008) but 
given the central role it plays in motivating various 
forms of drug use, it must be factored into thinking 
around policy responses to changing levels of use. That 
pleasure – or any quasi-medical or lifestyle “benefit”, 
such as relaxation, stress relief, or enhanced social 
experiences – is the primary desired outcome of drug 
use is indisputable, and for most drug users suggests 
a willingness to bear at least some degree of risk to 
achieve that outcome (Ritter, 2014). 
Casual / non-problematic use 
Recreational, casual or other use that has 
negligible harmful health or social effects, e.g., 
moderate cannabis, cocaine or MDMA use in 
social settings
Chronic dependence
Use that has become habitual and compulsive 
despite negative health and social effects, e.g., 
long-term opioid dependence, which is funded 
through acquisitive crime
Beneficial use
Use that has positive health, spiritual or 
social effects, e.g., medical pharmaceuticals, 
stimulants – such as coffee or tea – to increase 
alertness, sacramental use of ayahuasca, 
therapeutic use of MDMA
Problematic use
Use that begins to have negative 
consequences for individual, friends / family, 
or wider society, e.g., use leading to impaired 
driving, binge consumption, harmful 
methods of administration
Spectrum of psychoactive substance use
Adapted from: British Columbia Ministry of Health Services (2004)
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In fact, there are countless pleasure-seeking activities 
– be it sport, sex, sunbathing, or the consumption of 
sugar or fatty foods – that people are willing to engage 
in despite their risks. Society therefore accepts that a 
certain level of risk is permissible in order to achieve 
certain pleasures. Sometimes – in the case of, say, 
motorbike racing or some extreme sports – the risks are 
very high, and may not only be tolerated, but viewed as 
an intrinsic part of the experience.  
But with drugs, the overriding concern with reducing 
use has marginalised a more pragmatic and constructive 
debate about what motivates consumption, what 
level of drug-related risk or harm should be tolerated, 
and which policy approaches can help manage and 
moderate those risks. Instead, unlike with other risky 
pleasure-seeking activities, there is a range of groups 
and institutions dedicated to exaggerating potential 
harms and denying benefits. Rugby or American 
football, as played by the typical school student, is likely 
to carry far more risk of damaging the developing 
brain than cannabis, but there is no agency devoted to 
publicising those risks in the media. 
3. The impact of different  
     policy models on the 
     prevalence of drug use 
There are various approaches that can be taken in 
response to the use of currently illicit drugs, many of 
which – such as the introduction of harm reduction 
services or the intensification of enforcement efforts – 
can take place under a range of policy models. Rather 
than consider the impact of these kinds of relatively 
more incremental reforms on the prevalence of drug 
use, this report focuses on how, if at all, drug use differs 
under the three most commonly discussed overarching 
policy regimes. It will first look at drug use under 
prohibition, then under two options for reform – the 
decriminalisation of personal drug possession and the 
legal regulation of drug markets. It should be noted 
that there can be significant variation in the design and 
implementation of each of these policy models (drug 
prohibition in China is far more punitive than in the 
UK, for example). There is not space here to explore 
all the possible forms these policies can take, so this 
As discussed, care must be taken when inferring 
levels of drug-related harm from levels of drug use. 
The two are far from equivalent; that is why other 
indicators must be considered in order to determine 
whether drug policy is promoting public health and 
safety effectively.
Evidence from studies of alcohol use illustrate this 
point further. As one cross-sectional survey of the 
effects of alcohol in Russia, the Czech Republic and 
Poland found: “Overall alcohol consumption does 
not suffice as an estimate of alcohol related problems 
at the population level” (Bobak et al., 2004). This 
was because the Czech Republic, despite having 
significantly higher levels of alcohol use than 
Russia, experienced far less alcohol-related harm, as 
measured by the proportion of people whose drinking 
causes difficulties with, among other things, their 
relationships, work, physical, psychological or mental 
health and financial circumstances. 
Emphasising the way in which culture and patterns 
of consumption are important determinants of harm, 
this result was attributed to the fact that Czechs, 
while drinking more often and more as a whole, 
consume relatively small amounts per occasion, 
whereas Russians’ drinking is more concentrated 
– they drink less frequently, but consume large 
amounts of alcohol when they do (and such patterns 
of binge use tend to be associated with higher health 
and social harms). Studies of other countries have also 
found that low overall levels of alcohol use are by no 
means a guarantee of low levels of alcohol-related 
harm (Rossow, 2001; Ramstedt, 2001; Christie, 1965; 
Poikolainen, 1977; Room, 1974; Norström, 2001).
The disconnect between levels of drug use and levels of harm:  
evidence from alcohol studies
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report inevitably draws its conclusions from a more 
generalised conception of these three models.
3.1. Prohibition
Prohibition-based policies seek to reduce drug use in 
two main ways. First, the threat of criminal sanctions 
is intended to deter people from using drugs, while 
at the same time conveying to wider society the 
unacceptability of such behaviour. Second, supply-
side enforcement, in the form of measures such as 
drug crop eradications, drug seizures, and arrests of 
drug traffickers and dealers, is meant to significantly 
restrict (or eliminate, in the case of some countries) the 
availability of drugs, and in turn increase their price. 
Since demand for drugs is, to at least some degree, price 
elastic, higher prices should result in lower levels of 
drug use.
These two strategies for limiting drug use have been 
employed throughout much of the world over the 
past half-century. Consequently, there now exists a 
significant body of evidence on whether they actually 
achieve their stated aims, or at least fare better than 
other approaches.
3.1. a) Deterrence
Deterring people from using drugs is a complex 
business, and yet drug law enforcement, as traditionally 
carried out, takes an overly simplistic approach in its 
attempts to effect such change. Merely increasing the 
penalties for drug possession seems to have only a 
marginal impact on levels of consumption.
Evidence for this comes from three main sources: 
longitudinal studies following the impacts of 
changing laws, comparative analyses of jurisdictions 
with different enforcement models, and qualitative 
survey data.
In an example of the first type of research, the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) looked at the effects (if any) of 
reforms to various jurisdictions’ cannabis laws over 
time. Researchers examined data from nine European 
countries, to test what they call the “legal impact 
hypothesis” – essentially the theory that increased 
penalties will lead to a fall in drug use, and reduced 
penalties will lead to a rise in drug use. They concluded: 
“… in this 10-year period, for the countries in question, 
no simple association can be observed between legal 
changes and cannabis use prevalence” (EMCDDA, 
2011a). In other words, the fact that some countries’ 
cannabis laws became harsher and some became more 
lenient had no discernible effect on the number of 
people using the drug. 
There are, however, caveats to this research. As 
discussed later, in the section on decriminalisation, 
statutory laws are sometimes only loosely related to 
enforcement practice on the ground, and sometimes 
only change after enforcement has done so first. So 
in the absence of more detailed variables, it is difficult 
to establish the non-effect of a formal reduction in 
penalties. But, irrespective of this, it can at least be said 
that the symbolic message sent by a change in legal 
sanctions doesn’t seem to impact use. 
It is not just legal changes within countries that appear 
to make little difference. Comparisons of different 
countries’ approaches to drugs and their respective 
levels of drug use also produce the same result. A large-
scale study using World Health Organization data 
from 17 countries found: “Globally, drug use is not 
distributed evenly and is not simply related to drug 
Source: EMCDDA (2011a)
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policy, since countries with stringent user-level illegal 
drug policies did not have lower levels of use than 
countries with liberal ones” (Degenhardt et al., 2008). 
A 2014 evidence review by the UK Home Office came 
to the same conclusion, stating: “... we did not in our 
fact-finding observe any obvious relationship between 
the toughness of a country’s enforcement against drug 
possession, and levels of drug use in that country” 
(Home Office, 2014: 47). 
This disconnect between the intensity of drug law 
enforcement and prevalence of use is largely explained 
by the environmental and psychological factors that 
influence drug-using decisions (MacCoun, 1993; 
MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). Deterrence theory has 
its origins in a rational-choice model of social and 
economic behaviour, which assumes that people reason 
about the risks and rewards of their actions, making 
decisions based on what is most likely to produce the 
best outcomes. Hence if the perceived risk and severity 
of legal sanction is sufficiently high, it will outweigh 
the perceived benefits of drug use, with the result that 
fewer people will use drugs. 
However, drug-taking decisions are more complex than 
this model presumes. The decision to use drugs is rarely 
based on a simple weighing up of pros and cons; more 
often the cognitive processing behind the action is 
effectively automatic, requiring little effort or attention, 
perhaps being triggered by environmental cues 
(Fentiman, 2011). The risk of legal sanction is therefore 
likely to rank lower among the thought processes that 
lead someone to use drugs. 
Potential pleasure is typically a more important 
consideration than any potential penalties. This is 
because most individuals are disposed to present-
oriented behaviour, and the perceived gains of drug-
taking are relatively immediate and certain, whereas 
the legal sanctions for such behaviour are likely to 
be applied at a far later date, and in any case are not 
certain to be applied at all. 
Indeed, penalties are unlikely to be at the forefront of 
users’ minds given that, although many countries do 
arrest large numbers of people who use drugs, they 
are, in relative terms, only a small proportion of the 
total drug-using population. Data from several Western 
countries indicates that, throughout the mid- to late-
1990s, the annual probability of being arrested for 
cannabis possession ranged from between 1% and 3%, 
making the chance of arrest for any given incident 
of drug use vanishingly low (Kilmer, 2002: 129-130). 
This goes some way to explaining the limited deterrent 
effect of punitive drug laws, as evidence suggests that, 
in terms of preventing illegal behaviour, certainty of 
punishment, while still not a particularly good predictor 
of levels of drug use, matters more than severity 
(Lenton, 2005; Kleiman and Hawken, 2008; MacCoun 
and Reuter, 2001; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2004; Lee and 
McCrary, 2005; Nagin, 2013). Somewhat underscoring 
the emptiness of much “tough on drugs” rhetoric, 
Paternoster (1987: 191), in his review of perceptual 
deterrence studies, concludes: “perceived severity 
plays virtually no role in explaining deviant/criminal 
conduct.”
However, while the certainty with which punishment 
will be applied is marginally more important in 
deterring drug use than the severity of punishment, 
it is difficult to imagine how the chances of catching 
people in possession of small, easily concealable 
quantities of pills, powders and plants could be 
dramatically improved. Ignoring the question of 
whether criminalising ever greater numbers of people 
who use drugs is in fact desirable or even ethical, it is 
unlikely that even the most aggressive enforcement 
approach could increase the probability of punishment 
to sufficiently high levels (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001). 
At a minimum, it would put an even greater burden 
on already-stretched police resources, and involve an 
unprecedented infringement of civil liberties: in order 
to detect law-breakers, surveillance and searches of 
law-abiding people would have to be scaled up hugely.
The extent of the improvements that would need to 
be made to punitive, deterrence-based approaches is 
worth highlighting. Based on perceptual deterrence 
studies, it has been estimated that the certainty and 
severity of punishment accounts for just 5% to 10% of 
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the variance in cannabis use (MacCoun and Reuter, 
2001). And yet other research into criminal activity 
more broadly potentially undermines even this very 
modest proposed effect. One review found that when 
the impact of informal social and personal controls – 
such as peer attitudes and the perceived morality of 
the act in question – was factored into behavioural 
models, the deterrent effect of formal legal sanctions 
became statistically non-significant (Williams and 
Hawkins, 1986). 
Extra-legal factors are considered better predictors of 
drug use than the perceived severity and certainty of 
penalties (Williams and Hawkins, 1986), a finding that 
tallies with survey results showing non-drug users are 
more likely to cite a lack of interest, or a concern about 
health effects, rather than a fear of legal sanctions, as 
the main reason why they do not use drugs (Fountain et 
al., 1999; McIntosh et al., 2005; Rosenberg et al., 2008). 
Fear of legal sanction also plays virtually no role in 
motivating people to stop using illegal drugs: the 2015 
Global Drug Survey found that worries about getting 
caught by police were cited by only 3% of those who 
stopped taking cannabis and 2% of those who stopped 
using cocaine or MDMA (Pegg, 2015).
So although punitive drug laws are often justified 
on the grounds that they “send a message” about the 
unacceptability and dangers of drug use, there is little 
evidence that this message gets through to users, or has 
any significant impact if it does. The extent to which 
criminal penalties are a deterrent to drug use is at best 
marginal relative to that of other factors; informal 
social controls play a far greater role in regulating drug 
consumption (MacCoun, 1993; MacCoun and Reuter, 
2001). It is therefore possible that such controls would 
continue to constrain levels of drug use even after 
legal sanctions for possession are significantly reduced 
or eliminated entirely, especially if drug-market 
regulations are well designed. 
Criminal penalties for drug possession were 
introduced in the UK by the Drugs (Prevention of 
Misuse) Act, 1964.  This was followed by the Misuse 
of Drugs Act in 1971, which established the ABC drug 
classification system that included a hierarchy of 
penalties for possession. Despite this, the number of 
high-risk, dependent drug users known to services in 
the UK rose from around 2,000 in 1970, to more than 
40,000 in 1996, when the notification system was 
ended. As Reuter and Stevens (2007: 25) conclude: 
“Few health indicators have shown such rapid 
deterioration over such a long period.” The number of 
opiate-related deaths in England and Wales also rose 
from less than 50 in 1975 to 952 in 2014. Introducing 
punishment as a response to drug use, far from 
reducing levels of dependence and related health 
harms, therefore in fact saw them rise even higher. 
When the typical profile of people who engage in 
high-risk drug use is considered, the futility of a 
punitive approach becomes even more apparent. 
People with heroin and crack dependencies in 
particular, who are both likely to already have a 
criminal record and whose demand for their drug of 
choice is generally resistant to any interventions, are 
also the population creating the vast majority of drug-
related social and economic costs in the UK (Godfrey 
et al., 2002). Thus the population who use drugs most 
closely associated with the social and health harms 
created by prohibition are also the group least likely 
to be susceptible to its deterrent effects.
The failure of the deterrent effect: evidence from high-risk drug users in the UK
Source: Reuter and Stevens (2007)
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All of which is not to say that laws cannot shape 
behaviour; they clearly can. Drug laws and related 
regulations may have important declarative effects – 
restricting drug use by expressing and reinforcing social 
norms against it, as has happened in many countries 
with regard to tobacco smoking in public spaces, and 
with better enforcement of age restrictions for alcohol 
consumption. But there is little evidence that trying 
to express disapproval of drug consumption using the 
blunt instrument of criminal penalties for possession 
is an effective way of doing this. In fact, laws and 
enforcement within a legal, regulated market which can 
reinforce social controls, should be distinguished from 
enforcement against an illegal, unregulated market. 
3.1. b) Reducing availability by  
restricting supply
Given that demand for drugs appears to be largely 
unaffected by the threat of punitive sanctions for users, 
it is perhaps no surprise that the supply and availability 
of drugs has proven similarly persistent, particularly 
in light of the huge financial incentives for criminals to 
meet this demand. 
“Drug availability” is a potentially complex and often 
inadequately defined suite of interrelated variables. 
The UK government, for instance, has never developed 
a methodology for assessing it, despite often citing 
reductions in availability as a key aim of its drug policy 
(Rolles, 2009). Nevertheless, it is typically assumed 
that data on, among other things, drug prices, potency 
and purity, and people’s perceptions of how easy it is to 
obtain drugs are all facets of this multivariate construct 
(EMCDDA, 2011b). 
There must, necessarily, be a point at which availability 
becomes so low and prices so high that use of a given 
drug becomes impractical or effectively impossible, but 
supply-side enforcement only rarely appears to curtail 
the illicit trade to the extent needed to bring about 
non-trivial reductions in the use of a given substance 
(Reuter and Stevens, 2007: 63-64; MacCoun and Reuter, 
2001: 77). 
Most of the price effects of prohibition are due to what 
have been referred to as the “structural consequences 
of product illegality” (i.e., inefficiencies generated by 
producers, traffickers and dealers having to operate 
covertly [Reuter, 1983]). So while it is clearly true that 
the simple illegality of drugs artificially inflates prices 
far beyond what they would be in a commercial legal 
market, the intensity of supply-side enforcement 
seems to make little difference. Reviewing the relevant 
literature, Pollack and Reuter (2014: 1) conclude: “… 
there is little evidence that raising the risk of arrest, 
incarceration or seizure at different levels of the 
distribution system will raise prices at the targeted level, 
let alone retail prices.” A key issue here is that farm-
gate drug prices are so low relative to street-level prices 
that even if drug production levels are significantly 
reduced, or if seizure rates increase dramatically, any 
impact on the final prices paid by users will most likely 
be negligible; increased production costs can easily be 
absorbed due to the huge mark-ups that are applied 
throughout the supply chain (Reuter and Stevens, 
2007: 63). This inability of enforcement to affect price 
was illustrated in 2003, when despite global cocaine 
seizures rising to record levels, there was actually a 
slight decrease in the price of the drug in most major 
consumer markets (UNODC, 2005: 12). 
While drug prices regularly fluctuate, internationally, 
the long-term trend is of price declines despite ever-
increasing resources directed towards interdiction. 
Pointing to the resilience of drug supply and availability, 
data from official surveillance systems which monitor 
changes in the illicit trade show that, over the past 
two decades, while seizures of heroin, cocaine and 
cannabis in major production markets have generally 
increased, the average inflation-adjusted and purity/
potency-adjusted prices of these drugs has decreased 
dramatically (Werb et al., 2011):
• In the US, average prices of heroin, cocaine 
and cannabis decreased by 81%, 80% and 86% 
respectively, between 1990 and 2007.
• In Europe, during the same period, the average 
price of opiates and cocaine decreased by 74% and 
51% respectively.
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• In Australia, the average price of cocaine decreased 
by 14%, while heroin and cannabis prices decreased 
49% between 2000 and 2010.
And between 1990 and 2007, the average purity/
potency of heroin and cocaine in the US increased 
by 60% and 11% respectively (Werb et al., 2011). If 
prohibition was successfully reducing the availability 
of these drugs, then, as with price, the reverse trend 
would likely be observed, as suppliers and dealers dilute 
their products with adulterants in order to increase 
their volume.
When assessed by these proxy measures, it is clear that 
supply-side enforcement has, at best, only a limited 
impact on drug availability. Where such enforcement 
is most effective is in limiting availability to those 
wishing to make occasional impulse purchases. This is 
in contrast to heavy, dependent users, who are willing 
to expend more effort in seeking out drugs, and those 
who use more regularly, who will simply establish 
a reliable supply, whether it be a regular dealer, or 
an identified place where they can purchase. But for 
casual users, enforcement matters more, by imposing 
so-called “search costs” – the time and effort required to 
find a dealer willing to sell. If arrests of drug suppliers 
increase, users could find it more difficult to access the 
drug they wish to buy. However, the extent to which 
this scenario plays out in the real world is questionable 
given the speed with which dealers are replaced in 
many cities. 
Indeed, research broadly corroborates the notion 
that greater supply-side enforcement purchases 
little incremental gain in terms of reductions in 
use. Mazerolle et al. (2005) reviewed the findings of 
155 studies into 132 separate drug law enforcement 
interventions. Those studies which specifically 
evaluated the impact of supply-side measures on 
levels of use produced scant evidence that they 
reduce drug consumption. In many cases, localised 
crackdowns on drug markets, rather than resulting 
in fewer people using drugs, simply displaced users to 
markets in other areas. 
What the UNODC (2008: 216) calls “substance 
displacement” can also occur following an escalation 
of enforcement efforts: when the supply of one drug is 
temporarily disrupted, dealers and users turn to similar, 
more available products. This dynamic can be seen with 
the surge in popularity of mephedrone in the UK in the 
late 2000s, which was triggered, at least in part, by a 
sudden shortage of ecstasy (MDMA). After 33 tonnes 
of sassafras oil, one of the main precursors of ecstasy, 
was seized in Cambodia in June 2008, MDMA supply 
was dramatically curtailed – a rare success for supply-
side enforcement. But the UK drug market did not 
contract; instead, it adapted, and the use of mephedrone 
– which produces similar effects to ecstasy – took off 
(Appendino et al., 2014).
More recently, illicit chemists have found a way of 
synthesising MDMA without the need for sassafras 
oil, thereby bypassing this bottleneck in production 
(Sacramento, 2014). As a consequence, availability and 
purity has increased, with MDMA use rising at the 
expense of some new psychoactive substances that, like 
mephedrone, mimic MDMA’s effects. 
While drug availability, as measured by prices 
and purity, appears to have increased over recent 
decades, the picture is less clear-cut when measured 
by people’s perceptions of how easy it is to access 
drugs. The Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey has 
tracked adolescent drug trends in the US since the 
mid-1970s. It shows that the perceived availability of 
some drugs, most notably amphetamines, crack, crystal 
methamphetamine and cocaine, has declined over 
the past 40 years – in some cases, quite substantially 
(Johnston et al., 2014).
This trend has been accompanied by decreases in 
the use of these drugs (although similar declines in 
the perceived availability and use of other drugs, 
such as cannabis, ecstasy and heroin have not been 
observed). However, there is little reason to think 
that enforcement measures are responsible for it, 
particularly given their lack of impact on drug prices 
and purity during the period of decline. 
18
In contrast, MTF data on cigarettes highlights how 
perceptions of drug availability can vary as a result of 
regulation in a legal market: given their legal status, 
cigarettes are not in short supply but have been subject 
to greater enforcement efforts aimed at restricting 
underage sales, and their perceived availability has 
declined significantly in recent decades (Johnston et al., 
2014: 41).
It is also difficult to determine the direction of causality: 
are fewer people using certain drugs because they 
perceive them to be harder to obtain, or are they 
perceived as harder to obtain because fewer people are 
using them? If a drug goes out of fashion, or if there is 
an increase in its perceived risks, people may be less 
likely to seek it out or to come into contact with it, 
leading them to perceive its availability as low, even if, 
in actual fact, it is still in plentiful supply. The extent to 
which drug use is demand- or supply-led is therefore 
hard to establish.
Moreover, perceived availability often rises and falls 
independently of prevalence of use. The MTF survey 
notes that the decrease in the perceived availability of 
cocaine “does not map well onto the pattern of actual 
use, suggesting that changes in overall availability 
have not been a major determinant of use” (Johnston 
et al., 2014: 20). Hence despite cocaine use in the US 
falling dramatically during the mid- to late-1980s, the 
perceived availability of the drug actually increased 
over the same period (before stabilising and then 
falling significantly in the late-2000s). This undermines 
the idea that supply-side enforcement is necessary 
to reduce availability and, in turn, levels of use. In 
this instance, broader cultural changes and greater 
risk awareness among young people have been cited 
as the most likely explanations for the decrease in 
cocaine consumption (Bachmann et al., 1990); indeed, 
perceptions of risk increased sharply around the time 
that use was falling (Johnston et al., 2014: 21).
3.1. c) Levels of drug use under prohibition
As the spiritual home of the so-called war on drugs, 
and as the most vigorous enforcer of prohibition in the 
Western world, it is probably most appropriate to look 
to the United States for an indication of the success 
of prohibitionist policies in reducing levels of drug 
consumption.
As mentioned, over the past 40 years, the use of 
certain illicit drugs has declined among adolescents in 
the United States, and this decline has to some extent 
been mirrored among the general adult population. 
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(ONDCP, 2014) has tracked four drug trends since the 
late 1970s – past-month use of any illicit drug, past-
month use of cannabis, past-month cocaine use and 
lifetime heroin use. It has also monitored the lifetime 
use of methamphetamine since 2002. Although the 
survey omits questions on a range of other drugs, 
and methodological changes mean that comparisons 
An additional mechanism through which supply-side 
enforcement is intended to reduce drug availability 
and, ultimately, use, is by rendering it unprofitable 
for traffickers and producers. If the quantity of drugs 
seized is sufficiently high, then the available profit 
margins will shrink to such an extent that there is no 
financial incentive for involvement in the illicit trade.
However, this aim appears to be unrealistic, 
exaggerating the degree to which law enforcement 
is able to disrupt the drug market. The UK Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit (2003: 73) has estimated 
that Britain would have to consistently seize 60% 
of traffickers’ supply in order to put them out of 
business. Illustrating the near-impossibility of this 
task, from 2000 to 2006, heroin seizures within 
Scotland typically amounted to just 1% of the total 
amount of heroin consumed (McKeganey et al., 2009).
Making the supply of drugs uneconomic
19
between older and more recent figures should be 
treated with caution, there are some widely accepted 
trends that can be identified. While lifetime heroin use 
has increased over the past 40 years, the other four 
measures of use have all declined, with the decline most 
pronounced for cocaine, the consumption of which 
fell sharply from the mid-1980s before declining more 
steadily during the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, there are caveats to these declines that point 
to a more mixed record of success. The main issue 
is the time period over which consumption trends 
are measured. Over the past 40 years or so, there 
certainly has been a decrease in the proportion of the 
population using drugs in the United States. But the late 
1970s and early 1980s were historic high points, after 
which use dropped significantly before stabilising or 
in fact increasing. For example, the percentage of the 
population that reported using any illicit drug in the 
past month declined by more than half between 1979 
and 1992 – from 14.1% to the historic low of 5.8%, before 
rebounding by half, to 9.2% today. So although it is 
true to say that illicit drug use is lower now than it was 
when records began, there has been a 20-year period 
(1992-2012) during which consumption has been on 
the rise. This is despite ever-increasing expenditure on 
punitive drug law enforcement.
Moreover, as Caulkins (2005: 5) highlights, “total drug 
consumption does not always follow the number of 
users.” Hence the seemingly impressive reduction in 
the number of cocaine users in the 1980s is tarnished 
by the fact that the quantity consumed stayed the same 
throughout this period, as heavy users accounted for a 
larger fraction of the user population.
As with the United States, it is similarly difficult to 
make broad generalisations about the drug use situation 
in Europe over the same period. In some countries, 
drug use has gone up, and in others it has gone down. 
Overall, however, average annual prevalence in the 
European Union appears to have risen.
Globally, one thing is clear: the number of people using 
illicit drugs has not diminished – notably not since 
world leaders came together under the slogan “A drug-
free world – we can do it!” at the 1998 United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug 
Problem (Blickman, 2008). In fact, since then, despite 
the dominance of an enforcement-led approach, global 
drug production and consumption have increased. 
Reuter and Trautmann (2009: 16) summarise the 
situation as follows:
“The global drug problem clearly did not get any 
better during the UNGASS period. For some 
countries (mostly rich ones) the problem declined 
but for others (mostly developing or transitional) it 
worsened, in some cases sharply and substantially... 
In aggregate, given the limitations of the data, a fair 
judgment is that the problem became somewhat 
more severe.”
Source: UNODC (2012)
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3.1. d) Levels of alcohol use under 
Prohibition in the United States
Prohibitions can and do have some effect in terms of 
reducing or constraining consumption; but these effects 
are often short-lived and come at great financial and 
social cost. An instructive example is alcohol prohibition 
in the United States, which lasted from 1920 to 1933. 
Although alcohol consumption had begun to decline 
in the years leading up to Prohibition, it dropped even 
more sharply once the new law came into effect. Yet 
this decline was only temporary; by around 1929, 
consumption had rebounded to somewhere between 
60% and 70% of pre-Prohibition levels (Miron and 
Zweibel, 1991; Dills et al., 2005). This occurred despite 
a consistent and significant increase in enforcement 
spending during that period: appropriations for the 
federal Prohibition Bureau rose from $6.3 million in 
1921 to $13.4 million in 1930 (Miron and Zweibel, 1991).
However, while expenditure escalated and produced 
only a limited effect on use, there is evidence that 
Prohibition led to a significant reduction in cirrhosis 
deaths (Dills and Miron, 2003), and had an impact on 
alcohol-related domestic violence. 
An absence of reliable data has led to some dispute 
over the extent to which Prohibition should be judged 
a success, but there is a general consensus on two 
points: “Prohibition almost certainly reduced alcohol 
consumption, at least in its early years, and it promoted 
organized crime” (MacCoun and Reuter, 2011: 8). Yet 
widespread corruption, higher homicide rates, a violent 
illicit market, and health costs from consumption of 
unregulated products proved to be too a high price to 
pay for a relatively short-term decline in alcohol use 
and related problems, particularly given that around 
the same time, other nations, such as Australia and 
Great Britain, achieved greater reductions in alcohol 
consumption than the US simply through tight 
regulation (Levine and Reinarman, 2004). 
3.2. Decriminalisation
“Decriminalisation”, when discussed in relation to drug 
policy, is not a clearly defined legal term. While often 
mistakenly confused with the legalisation of drugs, 
decriminalisation is in fact generally understood to 
mean the removal of criminal penalties for possession 
of small amounts of certain drugs for personal use. 
Under a decriminalisation approach, possession 
generally remains an offence that may be subject to 
a civil or administrative sanction, such as a fine or 
mandatory treatment assessment, and whatever drugs 
found are confiscated.
Depending on how the policy is defined, there are 
around 25 to 30 countries that have carried out some 
form of decriminalisation of either cannabis or all drugs 
(Eastwood, Fox and Rosmarin, 2016). However, there 
is considerable variation in how decriminalisation 
policies are implemented in different jurisdictions, 
in terms of quantity thresholds (the amount of drugs 
deemed to be for personal use or for supply to others), 
the nature of civil sanctions (which can range from no 
sanction to large fines, or confiscation of passport or 
driving license), and who is responsible for enforcing 
them (police, judges, social workers and/or health 
professionals). Unlike the legal regulation of drugs, 
decriminalisation of this kind is permitted within the 
UN drug conventions and has been endorsed by a wide 
range of UN agencies (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012; 
Murkin, 2015).
In keeping with the finding that punitive laws do not 
significantly deter drug-taking, evidence from some of 
the most high-profile of these real-world reforms shows 
that removing criminal penalties for personal drug 
possession does not result in significant increases in the 
prevalence of drug use. Evidence from around the globe 
suggests this is true whether the decriminalisation 
process was accompanied by greater investment 
in health and harm reduction measures (as it was 
in Portugal, for example), or not (as was to varying 
degrees the case in the US, the Czech Republic and 
Netherlands). Such investment is, of course, desirable 
under any policy regime.
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3.2. a) Portugal
Portugal decriminalised the possession of all drugs in 
2001, and levels of drug consumption have changed 
relatively little in the years since. Drug use among the 
general population had risen slightly when measured 
in 2007 (a trend in line with other, similar countries 
[Hughes and Stevens, 2010]), but this increase was 
mostly restricted to a change in lifetime use, which, 
as discussed earlier, is the least useful prevalence 
indicator. Past-year and past-month drug use remained 
stable, and when last measured in 2012 were actually 
marginally lower than in 2001 (Murkin, 2014). The 
same trend was also observed among people aged 15 to 
24, the population most at risk of starting to use drugs 
for the first time. The apparent decline in recent drug 
use was mirrored by a reduction in the proportion of 
people who had previously used an illicit drug but no 
longer do (from around 45% to under 30% between 
2001 and 2012). 
Among school students, too, there is no evidence that 
decriminalisation led to increases in drug use. From 
around the time that the policy was introduced until 
2007, there was a marked decline in consumption 
across several age ranges (Hughes and Stevens, 2010). 
However, when measured again in 2011, this initial 
decrease had been reversed, and prevalence of use had 
returned to roughly the same levels recorded in 2001 
(Murkin, 2014). 
Overall, it is clear that decriminalisation had little to 
no effect on the prevalence of drug use in Portugal. 
But it may be argued that, although the country’s 
decriminalisation policy certainly reduced penalties 
for drug possession, it did not eliminate them entirely. 
Personal drug possession is still an administrative 
offence, and may therefore be punishable by fines or 
community service, for example. As such, in theory, 
there could be some residual deterrent effect from these 
sanctions. But in reality, would their removal lead to a 
significant rise in use?  
When people are caught with drugs in Portugal, they 
are often referred to a “Commission for the Dissuasion 
of Drug Addiction”, which decides what penalty (if any) 
the person should face. However, the majority – around 
80% – of those who appear before the commissions 
have their cases “suspended” – i.e., do not receive any 
penalty at all (EMCDDA, 2013). Furthermore, even 
when non-criminal administrative sanctions are 
included, the country has one of the lowest offence 
rates for drug possession in Europe (Vuolo, 2013: 151). 
This undermines the idea that Portugal’s drug policy 
is, at its core, still based on the application of punitive 
sanctions, and that these sanctions are responsible for 
the negligible changes in consumption post-2001. 
The shift away from criminalising or otherwise 
punishing drug users, combined with increased 
investment in health, welfare and treatment services, 
was also intended to de-stigmatise drug consumption 
and create an environment in which those in need of 
support are better able to access it. Portuguese drug 
policy officials argue that, in this regard (but also in 
many others), the reform has been successful (The 
Economist, 2009; Hawkes, 2011), and there is evidence 
to support their claims, as between 2000 and 2008, the 
number of people in day-treatment centres or opioid 
substitution treatment rose from 29,204 to 38,532 
(Laqueur, 2015). 
3.2. b) The Czech Republic
While Portugal, despite having decriminalised personal 
drug possession, has levels of use well below the 
European average, the situation in another country 
that follows a similar approach is markedly different. 
The Czech Republic decriminalised the personal 
possession of drugs in 2010, and has some of the 
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highest levels of drug consumption in Europe (Csete, 
2012). But what is relevant is whether use increased 
to these levels after decriminalisation.  The country 
decriminalised the personal possession of drugs in 2010, 
after conducting a cost-benefit analysis of criminal 
laws that were introduced in 2000 (Zabransky et al., 
2001). The analysis found that the introduction of 
criminal penalties had not reduced the availability 
of drugs, that the social costs associated with drug 
use had increased significantly during the time the 
penalties were in force, and that the penalties had 
failed to prevent drug use rising. It was these negative 
outcomes that prompted the Czech government to (re-)
decriminalise drug possession.
Importantly, although levels of drug use in the Czech 
Republic have historically been relatively high, they 
changed little following decriminalisation: lifetime, past-
month and past-year prevalence of the use of a range of 
drugs remained more or less stable. In some cases, there 
were slight increases, and in other cases, slight declines 
(EMCDDA, 2015c).
3.2. c) South Australia
Intra-national comparisons of drug use and drug laws 
also point to decriminalisation having little to no effect 
on levels of consumption. In 1987, the state of South 
Australia introduced what was called the cannabis 
expiation notice (CEN) scheme, which replaced criminal 
penalties for cannabis possession with civil penalties 
in the form of fines ranging from $50 to $150 (Single 
et al., 1999). The scheme also decriminalised the home 
cultivation of cannabis, initially allowing for up to ten 
plants, before being reduced to three plants in 1999, and 
now only one plant. 
Following these reforms, there was no increase in rates 
of recent (weekly) cannabis use, but there was a rise in 
the prevalence rate for lifetime use. However, this rise 
was not attributed to decriminalisation, because the 
increase in South Australia was not greater than that 
seen over the same period in other states that did not 
decriminalise (Kilmer, 2002; Donnelly et al., 1998).
Analysis of the effects of South Australia’s 
decriminalisation policy is, however, complicated by a 
subsequent “net-widening” effect that was observed. 
Because the CEN scheme enabled the police to process 
minor cannabis offences with greater ease, and because 
it reduced police discretion to give informal cautions, 
the number of people receiving civil penalties increased 
from around 6,000 in 1987/88 to roughly 17,000 in 
1993/94 (Christie and Ali, 2000). Due to implementation 
issues, a relatively low proportion of those given fines 
actually paid them, triggering criminal convictions in 
most instances. As such, the expiation system may, 
ironically, have led to more convictions than would 
have taken place without it (Christie and Ali, 2000). 
But regardless of the direction of change in the law 
– whether, on balance, it was more or less punitive 
in practice (if not intent) – the majority consensus 
among researchers is that the CEN scheme did not 
have an effect on the prevalence of cannabis use in 
South Australia.
3.2. d) The United States
A similar intra-national comparison of 
decriminalisation in practice comes from the US, where 
from 1973 to 1978, 11 states reduced the penalties 
for cannabis possession, making it punishable only 
by a modest fine (Single, 1989). Early studies into the 
effects of these reforms found they had no impact 
on levels of cannabis consumption in the states in 
question. However, later research suggests that some 
of these studies may have been flawed, because 
they treated all of the states’ reforms as equivalent 
decriminalisation approaches, when there was in 
reality significant variation between some of these 
policies: while some states had genuinely decriminalised 
cannabis, others had merely reduced the severity 
of sanctions while keeping cannabis possession a 
criminal offence (Pacula, Chriqui and King, 2004). More 
recent research that better accounts for these policy 
differences indicates that reduced penalties for cannabis 
possession were associated with increases in use, albeit 
relatively small ones.    
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3.2. e) The European Union
Finally, a 2013 study of European Union member-
states that took into account not only countries’ stated 
drug policy regime, but also actual arrest rates for drug 
possession offences, actually found that lower arrest 
rates and decriminalisation were both associated with 
lower levels of last-month drug use (Vuolo, 2013). The 
extent of this association – which was, statistically, 
“among the strongest and most consistent findings” – 
was such that in countries where criminal penalties 
for personal possession have been eliminated, young 
people have a 79% lower odds of having used drugs in 
the last month. 
3.3. Legal regulation
Those on the reform side of the drug policy debate 
sometimes conflate the proven, real-world effects of 
decriminalising drugs with the predicted effects of 
legalising and regulating them. Many cite the finding 
that lessening or removing penalties for drug possession 
does not appear to increase use as evidence that the 
legal regulation of drugs would not lead to significant 
increases in consumption. But while this is an 
important point to make, undermining, as it does, one of 
the central justifications for prohibition, there are other 
considerations to take into account as well. 
Although decriminalisation and legal regulation both 
involve the removal or reduction of legal sanctions for 
users of currently illicit drugs, under decriminalisation, 
the supply of drugs remains prohibited, so it is only the 
removal or modification of any user-level deterrent 
effect that may influence levels of consumption. By 
contrast, when considering possible changes in use 
under legal regulation, it is necessary to factor in not 
just the absence of this putative deterrent effect, but 
also changes to how drugs are made available, how 
they are promoted (if at all), and how social and cultural 
norms around their use might evolve, all of which are 
likely to affect levels of consumption. 
Legal regulation does not refer to one single policy 
approach; it can take many forms. For cannabis, for 
example, the graphic overleaf illustrates that there 
is a spectrum of regulatory options. At the more 
permissive end of the spectrum are minimal controls 
over a commercially driven free market, while at 
the more restrictive end is a market that limits 
availability to home cultivation, with everything from a 
government monopoly and a market run by non-profit 
companies in between.
Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) provide a space 
where people can consume legally or illegally 
obtained drugs in a safe and hygienic environment, 
under the supervision of trained medical staff. 
Since 1986, more than 90 DCRs have been set up 
in nine countries, and while primarily considered 
an effective harm reduction measure, they are 
also localised decriminalisation initiatives, as in 
and around such facilities, users are not subject 
to the legal sanctions for drug possession that 
they would otherwise face on the street. Despite 
eliminating such penalties, there is no evidence 
that DCRs increase levels of drug use or risky 
patterns of consumption (EMCDDA, 2010). There 
is, however, evidence that they have a range of 
positive outcomes, including reducing the incidence 
of fatal overdoses, helping to establish and maintain 
contact between drug users and health and social 
services, and reducing public order problems 
(EMCDDA, 2010; Zobel and Dubois-Arber, 2004; 
Debeck et al., 2011).
Drug consumption rooms: 
decriminalisation on a highly 
localised scale
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The devil is in the detail when it comes to whether legal 
regulation will be net positive or negative for public 
health and safety. Kilmer (2014), for example, identifies 
‘eight Ps’, key elements of a legal cannabis market for 
which regulation must be well-designed if the market 
is to be effective in minimising social and health 
harms. These are: production, profit motive, promotion, 
prevention, potency, purity, price, and permanency (i.e., 
the flexibility to significantly alter or abolish the market 
if it is deemed unsuccessful).
There is currently only limited direct evidence of 
the impact of any kind of legalisation and regulation 
on levels of drug use. Some of the most far-reaching 
instances of a formerly illicit drug being legalised and 
regulated for non-medical use are only just taking place. 
The world’s first, large-scale, de jure legally regulated 
cannabis markets are currently being, or have only 
relatively recently been, established – on a national 
level in Uruguay, and on a state/jurisdiction level in 
four US states and Washington DC. Of these, only 
two jurisdictions’ markets – the states of Washington 
and Colorado – have been operational long enough to 
generate any initial data. 
Along with evidence from alcohol and tobacco 
regulation, this and several other real-world reforms 
can provide relevant insights into the kinds of 
regulatory measures that can be used to manage 
impacts on levels of use. These include 40 years of 
a de facto legal cannabis market in the Netherlands; 
the cannabis social club system in Spain; the repeal 
of national alcohol prohibition in the United States; 
and heroin prescribing, which has taken place in one 
form or another for several decades, in a number of 
countries.
Before discussing the lessons that can be learned from 
these examples, a good place to start is with existing 
research that attempts to quantify the likely impact of 
legal regulation on consumption. Despite there being a 
spectrum of options for regulating legal drug markets, 
most estimates of potential changes in prevalence 
of use are based on the assumption that currently 
illegal drugs would be bought and sold within a highly 
commercialised legal market, subject to a degree of 
regulation similar to that currently applied to the 
alcohol trade in the US and other Western countries. 
 
3.3. a) The impact of price changes
Research in this area has focused primarily on cannabis, 
with much consideration given to how post-legalisation 
price changes might affect consumption. Assuming that 
cannabis was legalised under a US alcohol-style model 
of regulation, it is generally assumed that the price 
of cannabis would fall significantly, driven down by 
commercial competition, the emergence of economies 
of scale, and the removal of a risk premium associated 
with the illicit economy. As shown for a range of 
Adapted from: Caulkins, et al. (2015)
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substances, both legal and illegal, drug use is responsive 
to price. Hence it can be said with a large degree of 
certainty that price decreases would be accompanied 
by increases in consumption. The most widely cited 
estimate of the price elasticity of cannabis (the degree 
to which demand changes with price) is -0.54, meaning 
a 10% decrease in price would lead to a 5.4% increase in 
consumption if not mitigated by other measures (Kilmer 
et al., 2010). This figure would naturally vary depending 
on the drug in question. 
Since becoming operational in 2014, prices in the 
legal, commercial cannabis markets in Colorado and 
Washington State have begun to fall (Kleiman, 2015), 
and without regulatory controls to prevent prices 
declining even further, it has been suggested  that 
the pre-tax price of a cannabis joint in such markets 
could potentially fall to as low as 1% of its current level, 
making it as expensive as a tea bag (Caulkins, 2010). 
Based on the price elasticity estimate above, even 
if cannabis were subject to high taxes, prices could 
potentially fall so low as to trigger at least a doubling of 
consumption. While as previously noted, drug use and 
drug harm are not directly equatable, this nonetheless 
underscores the importance of price controls, and of 
regulation more broadly, in determining the outcomes 
produced by legal drug markets.
Price controls have long been debated in relation to 
the alcohol market, with public health officials and the 
drinks industry naturally clashing over the question of 
their effectiveness in terms of reducing use. But there 
is now strong evidence, reviewed in two meta-analyses 
of more than 100 studies, that when alcohol prices go 
up, consumption goes down (Gallet, 2007; Wagenaar et 
al., 2009). This is a statistically robust relationship that 
holds for consumption patterns of varying intensity. 
Minimum unit pricing (MUP), whereby government 
sets the “floor” price that must be charged for alcoholic 
drinks, is one of the most frequently discussed ways of 
safeguarding against the significant price declines that 
occur in a more commercially oriented free market. 
MUP was introduced in Canada’s Saskatchewan 
province in 2010, and the move has been associated 
with reductions in alcohol use and related fatalities 
(Stockwell et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2013). Given the 
weight of evidence that such measures promote more 
moderate alcohol consumption, they clearly merit 
consideration from policymakers contemplating how to 
establish a new legal drug market without precipitating 
markedly higher levels of use. 
3.3. b) Non-price factors
Legalisation will also have a range of “non-price” effects 
on consumption; the relative attractiveness of drug use 
is not just about how much it costs consumers. Indeed, 
the benefits to consumers of buying from a legal market 
are a major reason why legalisation has the potential to 
reduce the size of the equivalent criminal market.
Depending on how they are regulated, drugs, once 
legal, could be even more readily available than at 
present. The convenience of being able to access a 
reliable supply of a given drug from a licensed outlet, 
rather than sourcing them from dealers operating in 
a criminal market, clearly has added appeal. The same 
goes for the quality and consistency of the product, 
which along with proper labelling, could reduce the 
health risks associated with each incident of drug use. A 
greater range of appealing products – cannabis-infused 
drinks, edibles, and cannabis e-cigarettes (which avoid 
most smoking-related risks) are salient examples – 
could also help create a broader consumer base. And 
most obviously, advertising and other promotional 
activities could be designed with the express intention 
of increasing use. 
As discussed above, evidence from psychological 
research and places that have implemented 
decriminalisation policies suggests that it is informal 
personal and social controls, rather than legal status, 
that are the key determinants of whether or not people 
use drugs. However, this is not to say that the law 
cannot reinforce or undermine these controls. While 
decriminalisation does not appear to function as an 
endorsement of drug use – a signal to the public that 
drug use is now more socially acceptable – legalisation, 
under which all sanctions for possession and use are 
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removed, and the availability of drugs permitted, would 
likely send a stronger message. Particularly for people 
who (whether consciously or not) prioritise adherence 
to social norms, the simple illegality of an act may, 
independently of the sanctions associated with it, 
prevent people from engaging in it. Legalisation might 
therefore have a “symbolic threshold effect” for some 
people that is absent under decriminalisation, because 
the latter reform, while changing the severity of the 
penalties linked to drug use, does not alter its prohibited 
status. 
Other social deterrence factors – such as the shame or 
embarrassment experienced as a result of behaviour 
considered outside of accepted societal standards – 
are likely to be affected by moving drug use from the 
“wrong” to the “right” side of the law for some people.
For cannabis, it has (rather speculatively) been 
estimated that changes to these informal controls, 
along with other non-price effects of legalisation on 
consumption, could generate an increase in past-month 
use somewhere in the range of 5% to 50% (MacCoun, 
2010). Once again, the role of regulation is key here: 
if it is used to avoid or at least mitigate some of the 
non-price effects of legalisation that will tend to 
increase use, then increases in consumption are likely 
to be towards the lower end of this range of estimates. 
Evidence from tobacco regulation, for example, has 
shown that comprehensive bans on advertising are 
effective at reducing consumption (Henriksen, 2011). 
Similarly, since a greater concentration of alcohol 
outlets is associated with increased alcohol use (Popova, 
et al., 2009; NASADAD, 2006), controls on the location 
and density of drug outlets are likely to constrain any 
related increases in consumption. 
Regulation may also help shape the impact of 
legalisation on the social deterrence factors and related 
use levels specifically. While a changing of legal status 
may provoke an increase in consumption among certain 
groups, stringent and responsible regulatory controls 
are likely to moderate this effect. The adoption of such 
controls for tobacco products, combined with better 
education and prevention efforts, has fostered a norm 
of social disapproval for smoking, contributing to a 50% 
decline in prevalence in some Western countries over 
the past 30 years (HSCIC, 2013; Australian Government 
Department of Health, 2015). Crucially, it was not 
necessary to prohibit cigarettes, or criminalise smokers, 
in order to achieve this outcome. 
3.3. c) Cannabis “coffee shops” in the  
Netherlands 
Further support for the idea that well-designed 
regulation can help prevent dramatic increases in drug 
use comes from the Netherlands, where a quasi-legal 
market for cannabis has operated since 1976. The 
country has effectively decriminalised the personal 
possession and use of cannabis for adults, but unlike 
similar decriminalisation approaches that have been 
implemented elsewhere, it additionally tolerates the 
existence of outlets for low-volume cannabis sales – 
the well-known “coffee shops” – within a formalised 
framework. Since the introduction of this policy of non-
enforcement, various licensing conditions have been 
established in order to regulate the sale of cannabis – 
which is still technically illegal – from these commercial 
retail outlets. 
A notable feature of the approach taken in the 
Netherlands is that it maintains a prohibition on 
the supply of cannabis to the coffee shops. This has 
had the effect of preventing dramatic declines in 
cannabis prices, as growers and traffickers must still 
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operate illegally, producing and transiting cannabis 
in economically inefficient ways, as well as applying 
significant mark-ups to compensate for the risks 
of apprehension by law enforcement. Hence when 
analysed in 2005, cannabis prices on the Netherlands’ 
quasi-legal market were comparable to cannabis prices 
on the illicit market in the US (MacCoun, 2011). The 
Netherlands is therefore an example of (user-level) 
legalisation without dramatic price decreases, which, as 
discussed, could potentially produce large increases in 
consumption.
• The Dutch system emerged in several stages, each 
of which is recognised as having distinct effects on 
levels of cannabis use (MacCoun, 2011). 
• The first stage (roughly from the mid-1970s to mid-
1980s), during which there were only a relatively 
small number of coffee shops in operation, 
produced no detectable impact on consumption. 
• The second stage (roughly from the mid-1980s to 
mid-1990s) saw a significant increase in cannabis 
use, at a time when prevalence in many other 
Western countries was either stable or in decline. 
This increase has been attributed to the rapid 
proliferation and commercialisation of coffee shops 
that took place during this time, an effect that is in 
keeping with evidence from the commercialisation 
of tobacco and alcohol.
However, from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, there was 
a reversal of this trend: cannabis use in the Netherlands 
declined during a period in which it was increasing in 
other European countries. It has been argued that this 
decline is most plausibly explained by improvements to 
the way the coffee shops were regulated, as it coincided 
with the introduction of greater restrictions on 
advertising and marketing, the closure of nearly 40% 
of outlets, and a raising of the legal age for cannabis 
purchases from 16 to 18.
Thus while the use of a given drug may rise once it 
is legalised, the extent of any such increase is likely 
to be dramatically lower if commercial promotion is 
resisted, sufficiently stringent regulations are imposed, 
and prices are kept relatively high. There must also be 
scope to adjust regulations in order to deliver improved 
outcomes as a drug market beds in.
3.3. d) Cannabis social clubs in Spain
Spain offers another example of how a non-commercial 
approach can limit increases in drug consumption in an 
(effectively) legal market. Since the 1990s, the country 
has tolerated the establishment of cannabis social 
clubs, informal non-profit associations through which 
registered members can collectively produce cannabis 
for personal consumption. 
Catalonia is one of the areas most closely associated 
with the cannabis social club system, and while there 
was a proliferation of clubs in the region from 2007 
to 2011, it did not lead to a dramatic increase in use. In 
fact, during this period, cannabis use actually declined 
among the general population (Franquero and Bouso 
Saiz, 2015). The absence of commercial marketing or a 
profit motive to increase consumption or initiate new 
users, combined with the clubs’ relatively restrictive 
membership policies and culture of on-site use, likely 
played a role in this trend, helping to limit availability 
and restrict consumption to existing cannabis users.
3.3. e) The repeal of alcohol prohibition in  
the United States
If alcohol prohibition is a useful historical example of 
how such an approach affects drug consumption, then 
its repeal can also provide insights into the likely impact 
of legalisation and regulation. While alcohol use is now 
significantly higher than it was under Prohibition, 
there was no sudden explosion in consumption once 
the law was changed. MacCoun and Reuter (2001: 304) 
note that “[t]he most sophisticated estimates suggest 
barely any increase in total consumption in the 5 years 
following Repeal”, while Levine and Reinarman (2004) 
state that it was not until the end of the 1960s, 35 years 
after repeal, that per capita alcohol consumption rose 
to the pre-Prohibition levels of 1915. They attribute this 
to the strict regulatory policies established following 
the end of Prohibition, which were eventually relaxed 
in response to industry lobbying. In stark contrast to 
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today’s more lax regulatory climate, 15 states initially 
opted for state monopolies, while only nine permitted 
retail sales of alcohol without food (MacCoun and 
Reuter, 2001: 168). Delivering their assessment of 
the changing alcohol policy landscape at the time, 
Levine and Reinarman’s (2004) conclude: “Whatever 
public health benefits prohibition achieved in terms of 
reducing consumption, alcohol regulation in the 1930s 
and early 1940s accomplished them as well.”
3.3. f) Colorado’s commercial cannabis 
market
Colorado voted in favour of legalising cannabis for 
recreational use in November 2012. It is too early to 
say what the true impact of a commercial cannabis 
market has been on consumption, as the latest data on 
use only goes up to 2014, the year that the first retail 
cannabis stores opened. However, the legalisation ballot 
initiative, Amendment 64, became law on 10 December 
2012, enabling adults aged 21 or older to possess 
cannabis, grow up to six cannabis plants themselves, 
and give up to one ounce to other adult users. So while 
not particularly revealing at this stage, the available 
data provides a limited indication of the effect that a 
year or so of such legal activity has had on cannabis 
consumption. 
• The Healthy Kids Colorado Survey (2013) found 
that, in 2013, 20% of high school students admitted 
using cannabis in the preceding month, and 37% 
said they had at some point in their lives. Both of 
these figures are lower than the national averages 
(23.4% and 40.7% respectively), which are recorded 
by the National Youth Risk Behaviour Survey 
(CDCP, 2013)
• Looking at a different youth demographic, the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health found 
that, although cannabis use among adolescents 
(aged 12-17) and young adults (aged 18-25) both rose 
slightly in Colorado between 2011/12 and 2013/14, 
these increases were not statistically significant 
(SAMSHA, 2015)
• While arguably a lesser public health concern, 
there have, however, been statistically significant 
increases in cannabis use among adults in Colorado, 
but these are in line with broader national patterns, 
including states that have not legalised cannabis. 
Between 2011/12 and 2013/14, past-month 
cannabis use amongst those aged 26 and above 
in Colorado rose from 7.6% to 12.45%, while use 
among those aged 18 and over rose from 10.4% to 
15.17% (SAMHSA, 2015)
To date, the rises in adult cannabis consumption seen 
in Colorado are broadly in line with changes seen 
elsewhere in the US. However, they may, to some 
extent, be driven by a greater willingness to admit to 
cannabis use now that it is legal in the state, rather than 
an actual change in the number of users. The novelty 
and publicity around the newly legal market may also 
have been a factor, as curious older users in particular 
exercise their new freedoms. It is too early to say what 
will happen as this novelty wears off, but further 
increases in consumption would not be surprising given 
the commercial nature of the market.
3.3. g) Heroin prescribing
At the other end of the regulatory spectrum is 
heroin prescribing, or “heroin-assisted treatment” 
(HAT), through which dependent heroin users who 
have proven resistant to other forms of treatment 
obtain pharmaceutical heroin (diamorphine) from 
licensed pharmacists or doctors. Because HAT is 
considered a medical intervention, it is permitted 
under international drug conventions, even though it 
is effectively a form of legalisation. Indeed, for heroin 
users, entering HAT represents a move from illegal to 
legal supply, albeit supply within a strictly regulated 
medical framework. Such treatment programmes are in 
operation in a number of countries, including the UK, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany, 
and trials have been run in Canada, Spain and Belgium.
There is strong evidence from many places, over 
many decades, demonstrating that providing existing 
heroin users with a strictly controlled, legal supply 
of the drug can be an effective way of reducing the 
harms it cancause, both to users and wider society, 
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without leading to increases in drug consumption 
(Strang et al., 2015).
A systematic review (Ferri et al., 2011) carried out by 
the Cochrane Collaboration (widely considered the 
“gold-standard” source of evidence-based healthcare 
information) found that, for long-term, dependent 
heroin users who have proven resistant to other forms 
of treatment, HAT can:
• reduce criminal activity;
• reduce the risk of incarceration;
• reduce the risk of death;
• increase the likelihood of staying in treatment; and
• reduce the use of “street” heroin and other illicit 
substances.
4. Conclusions
As this report has attempted to show, the relationship 
between drug policy and levels of drug use is a great 
deal more complex than is commonly assumed. Changes 
in the consumption of a given drug are influenced 
by far more than just legal status and enforcement 
practices. Drug use is more likely to rise and fall 
in line with broader cultural, social or economic 
trends; the number of users arrested or trafficking 
organisations destroyed, and the severity and certainty 
of punishment, seemingly make little difference. 
In particular, the stark lack of evidence that legal 
sanctions are a meaningful deterrent to drug use 
should prompt governments to urgently consider 
decriminalising the possession of drugs for personal use. 
This is no longer a fringe position; it has the support of 
the World Health Organization (WHO), UNAIDS, the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime,2 the UN Development 
Programme, present and former UN Secretaries-
General, the Organization of American States, the 
UK government’s Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
2. Although the agency subsequently backtracked on its support. For 
more, see Rolles, S. (2015) ‘The truth behind the UNODC’s leaked 
decriminalisation paper’, Transform Drug Policy Foundation. 
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/blog/truth-behind-unodcs-leaked-
decriminalisation-paper 
Drugs, the American Public Health Association, and 
countless NGOs, academics, health professionals and 
law enforcement officials (Murkin, 2015). 
The use of criminal sanctions is the most serious action 
a state can take against its citizens; removing such 
penalties for people who use drugs therefore represents 
an important step towards a more humane approach, as 
well as being an effective means of saving money and 
redirecting police resources. Moreover, the benefits of 
such an approach are likely to be greatest for the most 
at-risk drug users; as the WHO (2014: ch. 5) has stated, 
decriminalisation is a “critical enabler” of access to, and 
uptake of, HIV interventions and services. 
While the number of places that have implemented 
decriminalisation policies means there is strong 
empirical evidence that they do not increase drug use to 
any significant degree, less is known about the potential 
impact of establishing legally regulated drug markets. 
The policy approaches outlined in the final section 
of this report do not allow cast-iron predictions to be 
made about how large-scale systems of legal regulation 
would affect levels of drugs use, but they do suggest 
that the risk of dramatic increases in consumption 
can be mitigated.
Well-managed legal markets that are cautiously and 
incrementally introduced, and that learn from the 
mistakes made with alcohol and tobacco regulation 
– by, for example, preventing price declines, limiting 
the range of drug products available, investing in risk 
education, treatment and prevention, and enforcing 
a ban on advertising or promotion – are likely to 
ensure that the benefits of legalisation do not come 
at the expense of an unprecedented rise in use and 
related harms. 
A number of jurisdictions have already begun legalising 
and regulating cannabis, and the evidence from these 
innovations is only beginning to emerge. For those 
that will inevitably follow, consideration should be 
given to avoiding the risks of over-commericalisation, 
and prioritising public health over private profit in 
the design of regulatory frameworks. Policy makers 
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should therefore examine the possibility of organising 
supply through not-for-profit entities, such as cannabis 
social clubs or community-interest cooperatives, or 
non-commercial market mechanisms, such as partial 
or complete state monopolies on the drug’s trade. This 
is the most cautious, evidence-based way of proceeding 
with legal regulation from a public health perspective. 
But experiments with legal regulation should not stop 
at cannabis. Governments should also start exploring 
how, in practice, other drugs might be regulated. The 
evidence on heroin prescribing in particular suggests 
that making higher-risk drugs available to dependent 
users, in a tightly controlled manner, via medical 
professionals, can produce substantial benefits. 
Finally, and crucially, it is important to reiterate the 
need to move away from a narrow focus on prevalence 
of drug use as the key indicator of policy success. Levels 
of use are only important in so far as they reflect levels 
of overall drug-related harm. Preventing or reducing 
drug use that causes harm is an appropriate policy goal; 
preventing or reducing use for its own sake is not. 
To seriously address overall harm, drug policy should 
be assessed using a broader range of metrics – impacts 
on crime, health, international development, security, 
human rights, the environment and the economy 
should all be front and centre when exploring new 
approaches and evaluating current ones. This more 
holistic strategy, combined with a fundamental shift 
away from criminal justice responses, is the way 
to ensure the international drug control system 
achieves its original aim of protecting the health and 
welfare of mankind.
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